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ABSTRACT
In this article we provide an in-depth description of a new model of
informed consent called ‘meta consent’ and consider its practical imple-
mentation. We explore justifications for preferring meta consent over
alternative models of consent as a solution to the problem of secondary
use of health data for research. We finally argue that meta consent
strikes an appropriate balance between enabling valuable research and
protecting the individual.
INTRODUCTION
The problem
The rapid increase in IT capabilities over the last 30
years have made it possible to store and analyse very
large datasets, and accompanying developments in lab
automation and analytic techniques have made it possi-
ble to easily extract omics information from tissue sam-
ples. These two developments have together led to a
situation in the health area where increasing amounts of
personal health data is stored in an easily accessible
form, and where this stored information has become
increasingly valuable for research. A significant propor-
tion of the research value is created by 1) the ability to
use data that are primarily collected for administrative
purposes (e.g. hospital episode data or prescription
data), and 2) the ability to link data from different sour-
ces, either with other health data or with data outside
the health area. There is a clear political will in many
countries to try to maximize the research yield from the
data under the banner of Big Data or The Learning
Health Care System.1
This, however, creates a set of ethical and regulatory
problems. What regulatory structure will at the same
time:
1. Protect the interests and autonomy of data sub-
jects; and
2. Optimize the possibility to conduct valuable
research
These problems are further complicated by the fact
that the data sources that might have to be linked in a
particular research project may have been originally col-
lected at different times, for different original purposes,
based on different legal justifications and under different
consent regimes.2 Going forward we can probably
achieve some degree of harmonization of legal justifica-
tions and consent regimes, but it is unlikely that all rele-
vant diversity between data sources can be removed. A
solution will therefore have to deal adequately with the
historical contingencies, as well as with continuing diver-
sity among data sources.
In the following paragraphs we will briefly outline and
criticise some of the suggested solutions to the problem,
before describing and defending a new solution meta con-
sent. Some of the critical points raised about other solutions
also need to be discussed in relation to meta consent and
will therefore be discussed more extensively in later sections.
Address for correspondence: Thomas Ploug, Aalborg University Copenhagen - Department of Communication, Lautrupvang 2b, Ballerup 3660,
Denmark. Email: ploug@hum.aau.dk
1 Information Commisioners Office. 2014. Big Data and Data Protec-
tion [Internet]. Information Commisioners Office; Available from:
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1541/big-data-and-
data-protection.pdf; Institute of Medicine; 2012 Best Care at Lower Cost:
The Path to Continuously Learning Health Care in America. Washington
DC: The Institute of Medicine.
2 This problem is further exacerbated when old data sources are
digitized.
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Informed consent
Many of the solutions involve a consent requirement,
and it is therefore necessary briefly to note that there are
several distinct but overlapping justifications for such a
requirement. The necessity to obtain consent from an
individual before acting in ways that affect that individ-
ual can be justified by ethical considerations relating to:
1. Protection from harm3
2. Respect for autonomy4
3. Protection of privacy5
4. Property rights in data or tissue6
5. Protection of bodily integrity7
6. Maintenance of trust8
The exact shape and strength of a consent requirement
will vary according to the exact way in which the require-
ment is justified. In this article we will assume that the
justification for a consent requirement in the sphere of
biomedical research is not based exclusively on consider-
ations of protection from harm. Many of the standard
consent requirements in research ethics regulation of
clinical research are only intelligible if they are supposed
to protect interests beyond the interest in not being
harmed.
Current solutions
Current suggested solutions to the problems of protect-
ing the interests and autonomy of data subjects at the
same time as optimizing the possibility to conduct valua-
ble research include:
• The no problem solution
• Opt-out/Right to be forgotten
• Blanket/broad consent
• Specific consent
• Ownership of data/tissue
The no problem solution
One suggested solution is to deny that there is a problem
to be solved. This often relies on a combination of two
distinct types of claim: 1) that there are no significant
individual interests at stake that need to be protected,
because the research process in relation to secondary use
of health data adequately protects privacy and cannot
cause harm; and 2) even if there were significant individ-
ual interests at stake these would in all cases of bona fide
research be outweighed by the public interests in the
research taking place.9 A subsidiary more technical claim
is that all models involving opt-out or consent may lead
to consent bias, i.e. the phenomenon that those who
agree to data use differ from those who do not agree.
The existence and size of this problem in relation to sec-
ondary research use of data is disputed.10
Taken as conceptual claims both 1) and 2) are obvi-
ously false. There is nothing inherent in or to research
using health data that entails that it necessarily cannot
cause harm and is always in the public interest. Taken as
empirical premises both are also doubtful.
Opt-out/Right to be forgotten
It has also been suggested that the interests etc. of data
subjects can be adequately protected if they are given an
opportunity to opt-out of research using their data, or if
they can exercise their Right to be forgotten.11
The right-to-be-forgotten suggestion is a pseudo solu-
tion. There are many types of health data, including
both administrative and clinical data, where people
would not be allowed to exercise a right to be forgotten
and have the data deleted. And, if we per impossibile did
allow people to exercise this right, it would cumulatively
be very damaging to research since the deleted data
could never be recovered. Persons could thus never
change their minds if they had exercised the right, and if
many chose to be forgotten, for instance after a public
research scandal, it could lead to huge holes in the avail-
able data.
General opt-out of research use of data is a way of
protecting the interests and autonomy of data subjects,
3 R.R. Faden & T.L. Beauchamp. 1986. A history and theory of informed
consent. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4 G. Dworkin 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; N.C. Manson & O. ONeill. 2007. Rethink-
ing informed consent in bioethics. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press
Cambridge; Available from: http://www.langtoninfo.co.uk/web_con-
tent/9780521697477_frontmatter.pdf [Accessed 24 Oct 2014].
5 T.L. Beauchamp & J. F. Childress. 2001. Principles of Biomedical
Ethics. 5th edn. USA, Oxford University Press, p.472; F.G. Miller.
Research on Medical Records Without Informed Consent. J Law Med
Ethics. 2008 Sep 1;36(3):560–6.
6 B. Godard, J. Schmidtke, J-J. Cassiman & S. Ayme. Data storage and
DNA banking for biomedical research: informed consent, confidential-
ity, quality issues, ownership, return of benefits. A professional perspec-
tive. Eur J Hum Genet. 2003;11:S88–122; C. Safran, M. Bloomrosen,
W.E. Hammond, S. Labkoff, S, Markel-Fox, P.C. Tang, et al. Toward a
national framework for the secondary use of health data: an American
Medical Informatics Association White Paper. J Am Med Inform Assoc.
2007;14(1):1–9.
7 F.G. Miller. op, cit. note 5.
8 O. ONeill. 2002. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press;.
9 Miller, op, cit. note 5.
10 M.A. Rothstein & A.B. Shoben. Does Consent Bias Research? Am J
Bioeth. 2013;13(4):27–37; M.A. Rothstein. Currents in Contemporary
Ethics. J Law Med Ethics. 2009 Sep 1;37(3):507–12; M.E. Kho,
M Duffett, D.J. Willison D.J. Cook & M.C. Brouwers. Written informed
consent and selection bias in observational studies using medical
records: systematic review. BMJ. 2009; 338:866.
11 J. lsen. Meta consent – A workable procedure in the area of Big Data?
BMJ online. Available at: http://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h2146/
rr [accessed 10 Dec 2015]
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but only if the option is well publicized and easily avail-
able. It is, however a rather crude instrument in that it is
all or nothing and therefore allows the data subject little
or no differentiation between different kinds of research,
different researchers etc.
It is possible for opt-out to be specific for every new
research use of data, but this would raise exactly the
same issues as discussed below for specific informed
consent.
Blanket/Broad consent
We could ask people to give an open-ended and unspeci-
fied Blanket or broadly specified Broad consent to the
use of their health data for research either when their
data are collected, or at some specific point in time. The
proposed revision of the US Common Rule, for
instance, requires broad consent for all future use of tis-
sue.12 There is a significant literature on whether blanket
or broad consent equates to informed consent,13 but
here, for the sake of argument, we will accept that blan-
ket or broad consent can constitute ethically valid con-
sent, when properly asked for and given.
There are, however good reasons to believe that many
tokens of blanket or broad consent to research will not
be valid, if the consent is sought in conjunction with
data collection. Most collection of health data occurs at
the point of care where the focus of attention of both
healthcare users and providers is likely to be on the clini-
cal problem or issue that is the occasion for the encoun-
ter with the health care system. Some users may be
vulnerable, and there may be time pressures involved
relating to standard lengths of consultations. It is
therefore very unlikely that the user will 1) receive even
the limited information necessary to give a valid blanket
or broad consent, and 2) will have the time or inclination
to think properly about the choice.
If blanket or broad consent is sought for all data at
one particular point in time, it is again a rather crude
instrument not allowing data subjects any differentiation
in their choices.
Specific informed consent
The gold plated solution would initially seem to be to
ask data subjects for specific, full informed consent for
every new research use of their data.
Traditionally this solution has been rejected on the
basis of pragmatic considerations, e.g. that the effort
needed to locate and communicate with data subjects
would be disproportionate, but just as IT developments
have made research easier it has also made search and
communication easier and cheaper. These pragmatic con-
siderations have thus lost much of their force. Building
on the significant IT developments a recent model of
informed consent – dynamic consent – suggests that
information about specific use of health data and tissue
and requests for consent for this use should be put to the
individual through a webbased platform.14 As part of
this solution, an individual should be given the opportu-
nity to tailor the level of information preceding consent
requests.
There are, however, other reasons why the gold-plated
solution may not be optimal from an ethical point of
view. The first reason is that, just like a model relying
only on broad consent, a specific consent model is crude
and insensitive to the preferences of data subjects in that
it does not allow those who are willing to give broad
consents for certain kinds of research to do so. Second,
there are reasons to doubt the validity of the consents
and refusals given. A resident of Denmark would, if spe-
cific consent was required before secondary research use
of data, potentially receive hundreds of consent requests
each year.15(28) This makes routinization of consent
behaviour very likely, i.e. the phenomenon that the
12 K.L. Hudson & F.S. Collins. Bringing the Common Rule into the 21st
Century. N Engl J Med. 2015; 10;373(24):2293–6.
13 V. Arnason. Coding and Consent: Moral Challenges of the Database
Project in Iceland. Bioethics. 2004;18(1):27–49; M.G. Hansson,
J. Dillner, C.R. Bartram, J.A. Carlson & G. Helgesson. Should donors
be allowed to give broad consent to future biobank research? Lancet
Oncol. 2006;7:266–9; M.F.A. Otlowski. 2009. Developing an Appropri-
ate Consent Model for Biobanks: In Defence of “Broad” Consent. In:
Principles and Practice in Biobank Governance [Internet]. J. Kaye J, & M.
Stranger, eds. Farnham, Ashgate Publishing; 79–92. [cited 2014 Sep 24]
Available from: http://ecite.utas.edu.au/60622; B. Hofmann. Broadening
Consent: And Diluting Ethics? J Med Ethics. 2009; 35(2):125–9; B. Hof-
mann, J.H. Solbakk & S. Holm. 2009. Consent to Biobank Research:
One Size Fits All? In: The Ethics of Research Biobanking. D.H.H. Sol-
bakk, D.S. Holm & D.B. Hofmann, eds. USA, Springer: 3–23. [cited
2014 Sep 24]. Available from: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/
978-0-387-93872-1_1; J.R. Karlsen, J.H. Solbakk & S. Holm. Ethical
Endgames: Broad Consent for Narrow Interests; Open Consent for
Closed Minds. Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2011; 20:572–83; G. Helgesson
In Defense of Broad Consent. Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2012; 21:40–50;
M. Sheehan. Can Broad Consent be Informed Consent? Public Health
Ethics. 2011 Aug 3;phr020; K.S. Steinsbekk, B. Kre Myskja & B. Sol-
berg. Broad consent versus dynamic consent in biobank research: Is pas-
sive participation an ethical problem? Eur J Hum Genet. 2013;21(9):897–
902.
14 J. Kaye, L. Curren, N. Anderson, K. Edwards, S.M. Fullerton, N.
Kanellopoulou et al. From patients to partners: participant-centric ini-
tiatives in biomedical research. Nat Rev Genet. 2012; 13(5): 371–376;
N.K. Kanelloupoulou, J. Kaye, E. Whitley, S. Creese, D. Lund, K.
Hughes. Dynamic consent–a solution to a perennial problem. BMJ.
2011; J. Kaye, E.A. Whitley, D. Lund, M. Morrison, H. Teare,
K. Melham. Dynamic consent: a patient interface for twenty-first
century research networks. Eur J Hum Genet [Internet]. 2014 May 7
Available from: http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/
ejhg201471a.html [accessed 2 Jun 2014].
15 The Danish Council of Ethics. Research with health data and biologi-
cal material in Denmark [Internet]. Copenhagen; 2015 p. 42. Available
from: http://old.etiskraad.dk/en/Udgivelser/~/media/bibliotek/udtalelser/
2015/Research-with-health-data-and-biological-material-in-Denmark-
Statement.pdf
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persons in question do not read the information and do
not reflect on the choice, but simply choose habitually to
consent or refuse in line with their previous choices. If
we chose to rely on consents to repetitive requests we
would be relying, not on real consent, but on a conven-
ient fiction.
Ownership of data/tissue
Finally, it could be claimed that the solutions discussed
above misstate the problem since they are not built on a
premise of personal ownership. If people own their data
and/or tissue researchers, research institutions or research
data brokers would have to engage with them to arrange
a (potentially commercial) transfer of ownership or rights
to use. It would also mean that we would at least have to
consider moving from a consent model to a contract
model, i.e. shift the transaction into a quite different
legal framework. A full exploration of the issues raised
by this model is beyond the scope of the current paper,
but it would share some of the issues raised by specific
consent requirements, and create new issues of cost and
burdens for the research endeavour.16(29,30)
In the following main parts of the article we will first
define and describe meta consent as a new model for
protecting the interests and autonomy of data subjects in
the context of secondary research using health data, and
then proceed to discuss how this model differs from
already proposed models and why it is preferable in the
specific context of secondary research use of health data.
META CONSENT – THE MODEL
The basic idea
As outlined above, traditional accounts of informed con-
sent make a person the locus of a request to consent to
participation in research. By contrast meta consent
denotes the idea that people should be asked how and
when they would like to be presented with a request for
consent.17 That is, people should be asked to design how
they in the future would like to provide consent to the
use of their personal health data and biological material.
By expressing a preference for how and when to provide
consent, people can be said to provide consent on a
meta level. This is the defining idea in the model of meta
consent.
Is the possibility of expressing a preference for how
and when to provide consent relevant and valuable to the
individual in practice? That is, is it likely that people will
1) have preferences for how and when to provide consent
and 2) have intelligible reasons for these preferences
making the option of making choices based on such
preferences valuable to them? We believe it is. A prefer-
ence for how and when to be asked for consent may
reflect responsiveness to individual reasons related to
underlying individual differences in:
• Values
• Vulnerabilities
• Trust
People hold different values with implications for the
legitimacy of purposes of research or for the conditions
under which research is undertaken. Although research
with potential health benefits is typically recognized as
valuable, people differ widely in their views on the value
of commercially driven research, dual use research
(research with military and non-military use), research
that involves what people believe to be sensitive and per-
sonal data, research that may stigmatize groups in soci-
ety, etc.18 If a person holds values with implications for
the legitimacy of the purposes of research and for the
conditions under which research is undertaken, it not
only ceteris paribus gives this person reasons to provide
or refuse consent in a number of cases when asked, but it
also provides this person with a reason for preferring to
be asked for consent when relevant. On the other hand,
if a person believes that all (health) research is always of
benefit to society, this not only gives this person a reason
to consent when asked, but it also more generally pro-
vides this person with a reason for preferring an option
to consent to as much as research as possible in one go.
Differences in peoples interests in how often to provide
consent may also reflect emotional reactions to research
on personal health data. Some may react with embarrass-
ment in the face of knowing that others have access to
their personal and, what they perhaps believe to be,
16 P.M. Schwartz. Property, Privacy, and Personal Data. Harv Law Rev.
2004;117(7):2056–1283; R. Rao. Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract,
or Privacy Rights in the Human Body? J Law Med Ethics. 2007 Sep
1;35(3):371–82.
17 T. Ploug & S. Holm. Meta consent: a flexible and autonomous way of
obtaining informed consent for secondary research. BMJ. 2015 May
7;350(may07 31):h2146–h2146; T.Ploug & S. Holm. Going Beyond the
False Dichotomy of Broad or Specific Consent: A Meta-Perspective on
Participant Choice in Research Using Human Tissue. Am J Bioeth.
2015;15(9):44–6.
18 G. Barrett, J.A. Cassell, J.L. Peacock, & M.P. Coleman. National sur-
vey of British publics views on use of identifiable medical data by the
National Cancer Registry. BMJ. 2006 4;332(7549):1068–72; B.S. Buck-
ley, A.W. Murphy & A.E. MacFarlane. Public attitudes to the use in
research of personal health information from general practitioners
records: a survey of the Irish general public. J Med Ethics. 2010 Nov
11;jme.2010.03790; B. Campbell, H. Thomson, J. Slater, C. Coward, K.
Wyatt & K. Sweeney. Extracting information from hospital records:
what patients think about consent. Qual Saf Health Care.
2007;16(6):404–8; M.M. Al-Qadire, M.M. Hammami, H.M.
Abdulhameed & E.A.A. Gaai. Saudi views on consenting for research
on medical records and leftover tissue samples. BMC Med Ethics. 2010
Oct 18;11(1):18.
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sensitive information, even if the data are anonymized.
Some will worry about how these data may be used, by
whom and for what purposes both now and in the future.
Some will be anxious that data security is poor and data
may be lost. Others will be completely indifferent to all
such concerns – perhaps because they do not consider
health data to be sensitive. The key point here is that indi-
vidual reactions may provide different individuals with dif-
ferent reasons for trying to control the flow of personal
sensitive information. This control may be exercised
through actual consent behaviour but it may also be exer-
cised by a demand to be asked for consent more or less
often.
Differences in peoples interests for how often to pro-
vide consent may also reflect differences in trust in
researchers. Trust involves having a strong belief or expec-
tation that others will act in a particular way. Our trust in
others is inter alia influenced by the extent to which they
meet our expectations in certain matters. We may trust
health care professionals to offer adequate treatment and
researchers to do research for the greater good, and trust
both groups to protect the rights of the individual
patient.19 Such expectations are likely to be based on an
intricate mixture of our previous first and second hand
experiences of the clinical and research settings, social
norms about adequate health care and sound research,
and our own beliefs and values concerning adequate care
and research. When such expectations are disappointed,
trust may be reduced. When they are met, trust is main-
tained or may be increased. The point here is, again that
individual levels of trust based may provide reasons for
different consent behaviour but also reasons for wanting
to be asked for consent more or less often.20(38–40)
The defining idea in the model of meta consent is the
idea that people should be given the opportunity to
make choices based on their preferences for how and
when to provide consent. We have argued that from an
individuals perspective this represents a relevant and val-
uable option of choice, and that there are good grounds
for believing that individuals will have an interest in
designing future consent requests.
The six elements of a model of meta consent
The model of meta consent may be described both for-
mally and substantively. In a formal description meta
consent is any model of consent that allows an individual
to express a preference for how and when to provide con-
sent, i.e. to design future consent requests, and it has the
following six elements:
1) A limited number of categories for designing con-
sent requests
2) A key for the prioritization of consent requests
3) A definition of the time for providing meta consent
4) A default setting if meta consent is not provided
5) A scheme for redesigning meta consent
6) A method and infrastructure for requesting and
recording meta consent
For each of these formal constituents, an actual imple-
mentation of a model of meta consent will involve
choosing one option among competing alternatives. Both
the formal elements and the choices involved in any sub-
stantive account of meta consent may obviously be sub-
ject to discussion. In the following we shall briefly
elaborate on each of these elements and in particular the
implementation of meta consent we favour.
The categories for designing consent requests
The first essential component in the model of meta con-
sent is the idea that a person should be provided with a
predefined set of types of consent, a set of types of data,
and a set of types of research contexts with which to
design future consent requests. That is, a person should
be able to choose how and when to provide consent
based on predefined categories of consent, data and con-
texts of research. We suggest values for each of the three
variables in Figure 1.
The values to be implemented in a specific implemen-
tation of meta consent should, to some extent, be
defined according to the preferences of the population
in which the implementation is to be used, and accord-
ing to the specific legal situation. The values suggested
here are thus not fixed but we take them to be reasona-
ble suggestions.
Specific consent is – as indicated – consent requests not
for each and every use of data but for each new specific
project using data. Broad consent is consent for broader
categories of research such as, for instance, cancer-related
research. A person choosing the broad consent option
would be asked for broad consent the first time his or her
data was being used in a project within a given category.
These categories could be predefined or they could be
derived from the purposes of research projects submitted
to the system. Blanket consent and blanket refusal are
one-off decisions concerning participation or non-
19 O. ONeill. 2002. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press; 22; O. ONeill. Accountability, trust and
informed consent in medical practice and research. Clin Med. 2004 May
1;4(3):269–76.
20 H. Busby. Consent, trust and ethics: reflections on the findings of an
interview based study with people donating blood for genetic research
for research within the NHS. Clin Ethics. 2006 Dec 1;1(4):211–5; C.S.
Molyneux, N. Peshu & K. Marsh. Trust and informed consent: insights
from community members on the Kenyan coast. Soc Sci Med.
2005;61(7):1463–73; E. Sala, J. Burto & G. Knies. Correlates of Obtain-
ing Informed Consent to Data Linkage Respondent, Interview, and
Interviewer Characteristics. Sociol Methods Res. 2012 Aug 1;41(3):
414–39.
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participation in research. Concerning types of data, it is
worth mentioning that we are here making no distinction
between tissue and already sequenced genomic data.
Neither do we distinguish between anonymized, pseudony-
mized and person-identifiable data in health databases. We
believe that none of these distinctions make a fundamental
philosophical difference in relation to whether or not these
categories of data should be subject to consent procedures.
It is clear that, for instance proper anonymization removes
some risks relating to privacy and harm, but it is not clear
that it removes all risks, or that it is relevant to other rea-
sons people may have for controlling their health data. A
decision concerning whether or not to include this distinc-
tion in an implementation of meta consent should there-
fore take into account the views in the population
regarding the importance of this distinction.
We do, however, distinguish between health and non-
health related data simply because we believe that people
may have different consent preferences across these cate-
gories of data. Finally, in terms of contexts, they may in
some countries be partly overlapping. Thus, in many
European countries, private research will be commercial
and public research will be non-commercial. This is not
the case in all countries, and again we believe that actual
consent preferences will to some extent depend on these
features of the research context.
On the basis of the categories found in Table 1 a per-
son may now design future consent requests by pairing a
type of consent (X) with either a type of data (Y) or a
type of context (Z). This could be done using a simple
form or tick-box as in Table 1, or as an interactive web-
site or app.
A completed form of this kind makes up a meta con-
sent. Restated in natural language a completed form in
this example corresponds to seven statements of the
form:
1) In relation to the future research use of my Y, I
wish to be asked for/wish to X
2) In relation to the future use of my data for Z
research, I wish to be asked for/wish to X
Table 1. Meta consent form
Meta consent Types of consent (X)
Types of Data (Y) Specific Broad Blanket Refusal
EPR (Electronic Patient Record)
Tissue/Genomic data
Health Databases
Linkage to non-health data
Types of Context (Z) Specific Broad Blanket Refusal
Private Public
Commmercial Non-commercial
National International
Type of Context (Z) 
Private/Public 
Naonal/ 
Internaonal 
Commercial/ 
Non-commercial 
Type of Data (Y)  
EPR  
(Electronic Paent 
Record) 
Health Databases 
Meta Consent 
Tissue/Genomic data  
Linkage to  
Non-health Databases  
Type of Consent (X) 
Consent to all research 
(Blanket Consent) 
Refuse consent to all 
research 
 (Blanket Refusal) 
Consent for every  
research project 
(Specific Consent) 
Consent for broader  
categories of research 
(Broad Consent) 
Figure 1 Possible values of meta
consent
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Thus if a person ticks off the box in the left hand cor-
ner it reads In relation to the future research use of my
Electronic Patient Record, I wish to be asked for specific
consent. It means that the person requires to be asked
for consent for every research project in which data from
his or her electronic patient record is used.
After a person has filled in the form the meta consent
system can then provide feedback on the implications of
the choices in relation to 1) the likely number of consent
requests the person will receive in the future, and 2) the
likely extent of use of the persons data for research.
After having received this feedback the person can then
either confirm, or modify the choices.
The prioritisation of consent requests
All research projects for which meta consent applies always
both involve a type of data (Y) and are conducted in a
research context (Z) that may be characterized by one or the
other of the predicates listed for each of the three types of
context. A particular research project may involve tissue
and be conducted as a public, non-commercial project in a
national setting. Several entries in the meta consent form is
therefore of relevance for such research projects. The third
component of the model of meta consent is the choice of
how to interpret or balance a persons potentially different
consent requirements related to the type of data used in a
research project and related to the various contexts of a
research project. We suggest that a persons strongest con-
sent requirement should dominate all other consent require-
ments with the following order of dominance, where
X>Y means that X dominates Y: Blanket refusal>
Specific consent>Broad consent>Blanket consent. To
illustrate, if a person has required specific consent requests
for research on his or her tissue, and broad consent requests
for public research, then public research on tissue would
have to request consent for each research project, and so on.
Our choice of how to prioritize a persons consent require-
ments is based on the view that it should be left to the indi-
vidual to the largest extent possible to decide if they want
make to make their data and tissue available for research
projects to which different individual consent requirements
apply. In this way we protect individual preferences.
The timing and presentation of meta consent
The model of meta consent requires the individual to
design future consent requests. When should this happen?
Since many societies endow the individual with full legal
capacity around the age of 18 years, this may be the
appropriate time for collecting an initial meta consent.
People who do not provide a meta-consent can then be
reminded of the possibility in various ways, e.g. when they
use national health portals, visit their GP or renew their
driving licence or passport etc. When and where reminders
are most appropriately generated and issued will depend
on the local context. It will, however rarely be appropriate
to require people to complete a meta-consent as part of a
clinical encounter, for reasons discussed in the section on
broad consent in the Introduction.
The presentation of the meta consent choice should
make it clear that this is an important choice with signifi-
cant future implications. There have to be ongoing public
information campaigns and issues relating to consent for
research could be included in the school curriculum. The
actual meta consent system could also promote reflective
decision-making by providing feedback on the implica-
tions of choices and by requiring endorsement of the
choices made after a cooling off period.
The types of consent, data, and contexts (see Figure 1)
have to be clearly described and further information
should be easily available, for instance in pop-ups. It
has to be noted that there is a significant difference
between the meta consent choices and the standard
choice of participating in a clinical trial. The amount
and specificity of the information needed to make a fully
informed choice differs significantly. Persons who have
strong preferences for knowing every single detail about
a research project before deciding to participate or not
can easily be provided with enough information about
the meta choices to make it clear that they should choose
consent for every research project in the meta consent
system. Given the importance of the meta consent
choice, the information should be designed to maximize
understanding and should be tested in the relevant popu-
lation before the implementation of the system.
A default setting if meta consent is not
provided
A meta consent system need to define a default that is
implemented if a person does not provide meta consent
despite repeated reminders, or does not provide a com-
plete meta consent (i.e. leaving empty boxes in the con-
sent form). This default has to be communicated clearly
in invitations to provide meta consent. Meta consent rep-
resents an important opportunity for a person to influ-
ence the future use of his or her data and tissue in
various contexts. It provides the individual with a strong
right to control the use of personal health data. How-
ever, as a right it may be waived. What should the
default be if people choose not to exercise their meta
consent rights? As we have already stated there are sig-
nificant benefits that flow from research using health
data and tissue and every one of us therefore has good
general reasons to contribute to research. We therefore
think that setting a default of broad or blanket consent
strikes the right balance between the different interests at
stake. Individuals will have been presented with the possi-
bility to make a choice, and the fact that they have not
made one provides at least a partial indication that they
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do not consider the choice to be important. In this case
it seems acceptable to let general interest in scientific
research decide the default. However, the exact specifica-
tion of the default must, like other aspects of a concrete
implementation of the model take account of both the
preferences of the population and the prevailing legal
regulation. It may, for instance, make sense to specify
different defaults for particularly sensitive types of data
or types of research. The model allows for this. The
defaults may thus in the end differ between different
implementations of the model.
The redesigning of meta consent
A person may over time come to have strong reasons for
changing his or her views concerning when and how to
provide consent in the light of personal experiences, scien-
tific developments, or events at a societal level. A meta
consent system should therefore allow people to modify
the meta consent choices if and when they wish to do so.
Such changes would then govern the generation of con-
sent requests in relation to future projects using their data.
The system could also actively prompt people to re-
state or reconfirm their choices at regular intervals, e.g.
every five years in order to ensure that the consent pref-
erences recorded in and used by the system are in
accordance with the persons current preferences.
The recording of meta consent and the
generation of consent requests
The sixth component concerns the practical implementa-
tion of the model of meta consent. A meta consent sys-
tem can be implemented as an integrated IT platform
that generates the meta consent requests and reminders,
allows persons to record and change their meta consent,
and generates consent requests based on the individuals
meta consent choices. This could most easily be imple-
mented in contexts where citizens are uniquely identifia-
ble (e.g. through a unique social security number), where
this identifier is in general use, and where they already
have an official e-mail address or electronic mail box
that is used in communications with public authorities.
But even in such contexts, there will be a small group of
people who are exempted from the use of electronic com-
munications for a variety of reasons and a meta consent
system must include a mechanism by which they can eas-
ily register their meta consent preferences.
Researchers would interact with the other side of the
meta consent platform. At the same time as they are sub-
mitting their data requests to the relevant holders of the
data they would submit a specification of the position of
their project in relation to the values included in the meta
consent model and a specific information sheet and con-
sent form to the meta consent platform. The platform
would then 1) issue specific consent requests to those data
subjects who have made this choice and predefined broad
consent forms to data subjects who have this preference
and have not previously given broad consent for the rele-
vant type of research, 2) collect consents and refusals, and
3) provide data providers with a list of those data subjects
who allow their data to be used, i.e. those who have pro-
vided either blanket, broad or specific consent covering
the specific research project, and those who have not
stated a preference but who are covered by a default.
In addition to the functions that are necessary for meta
consent the system could also easily be designed to pro-
duce individualized feedback to users on when, and for
what purposes their data had been used, if they wanted to
have such feedback. And it could produce general infor-
mation about the overall use of health data for research.
The system would already contain the information neces-
sary to produce both individual and general feedback, and
it would be easy to extract. Adding a feedback functional-
ity would incorporate an important aspect of the dynamic
consent model into the meta consent system.21(25–27)
The six elements of meta consent – Formal
conditions and substantial choices
We started this section by listing the six formal conditions
of the model of meta consent. Subsequently we have sug-
gested how each of the conditions should be should be
met in a specific, substantive implementation of meta con-
sent. We have in this process only briefly sketched our rea-
sons for making the particular choices. All of these
choices may be subjected to further analysis and criticism,
and they may eventually be revised without compromising
the formal conditions of the model of meta consent. That
is, there are many alternative possible implementations of
meta consent that satisfy the formal conditions, and which
one to choose depends on the context of implementation.
In the remainder of this article, however, we shall be argu-
ing that any model of meta consent satisfying the formal
conditions ceteris paribus will improve the conditions for
individual decision-making.
META CONSENT – IMPROVING
CONDITIONS OF DECISION-MAKING
As already argued, meta consent provides an individual
with an opportunity to express a preference that is likely
to be relevant to and valuable for the individual. This is
both part of the rationale behind the model of meta con-
sent and also, clearly, a strength in comparison with
21 J. Kaye, L. Curren, N. Anderson, K. Edwards, S.M. Fullerton, N.
Kanellopoulou, et al. From patients to partners: participant-centric ini-
tiatives in biomedical research. Nat Rev Genet. 2012;13(5):371–6; N.K.
Kanelloupoulou, J. Kaye, E. Whitley, S. Creese, D. Lund & K. Hughes.
Dynamic consent – a solution to a perennial problem. BMJ. 2011; Kaye
et al. op. cit. note 14.
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alternative models of consent. We believe, however, that
in the particular context of secondary use of health data,
the model of meta consent is also preferable to compet-
ing alternative models of consent because of improving
the conditions of individual decision-making concerning
participation in research. More specifically, the possibil-
ity of providing meta consent enables preferences that
are 1) more informed and deliberated, and 2) more con-
sistent to a greater degree than alternative models of con-
sent. In the following we aim to show 1) and 2) in turn.
Maximally informed and deliberated
preferences
It seems that regardless of the justification of a require-
ment of informed consent it is desirable that any imple-
mentation of such a requirement promotes informed
and deliberated preferences regarding participation in
research. In slightly different words, a model of informed
consent should aim to provide the individual with condi-
tions of decision-making that furthers informed and deli-
berated preferences concerning participation in research.
Although different models of informed consent may lead
to informed and deliberated preferences concerning par-
ticipation in research passing a threshold of acceptability,
it seems that we should, all other things being equal, pre-
fer a model of informed consent that lead to more
informed and deliberated preferences than alternative
models of consent. That is, we should prefer a model
that under the given circumstances maximizes the level
of information and deliberation on which decision to
consent or refuse consent is based, without sacrificing
other important considerations
Recent research suggest that there is an intricate balance
between the number of consent requests, the information
provided, and the level of information and deliberation a
decision to consent or refuse consent is actually based on.
Thus the provision or refusal of consent may become rou-
tinized. Routinization occurs when the provision or refusal
of consent becomes an act of routine, i.e. a habitual, unre-
flective act.22 In a recent study on consent behaviour in
relation to the use of webportal containing personal health
data, we have provided evidence of routinization.23 The
users of the portal are required to consent to the terms
and conditions of use and the data protection policy of the
site before use on the basis of being informed about these.
Taking a low degree of reading of relevant information
material to be indicative of routinization, the study finds
that 79% of respondents read half or less of the relevant
information materials before using the portal, indicating a
significant degree of routinization among the users.
Among the main reasons for not reading are the high gen-
eral frequency of having to read such material, the length
of the material and the time it takes to read the material.
Some also provide as reason for not reading that the text
is incomprehensible and that the consent process is just a
hurdle to be overcome. None of these reasons indicate
that the users have reflected on the conditions of use and
the data protection policy without having read the relevant
information material, and therefore they are fully consist-
ent with the routinization indicated by their failure to
read. Although there are differences between the context
of a health related website and the research context, this
study certainly provides evidence to the effect that consent
may become routinized. The possibility of routinization
shows that an individuals preferences concerning whether
or not to participate in research cannot simply be thought
of as being based on information and reflection, or lack of
it. The provision or refusal of consent will to very different
degrees be based on information and deliberations on this
information. Note that routinized choices may still reflect
an individuals preferences but, except in cases where peo-
ple have blanket preferences, the fit between choice and
preference is merely coincidental. That is, the person mak-
ing the routinized choice does not know whether it fits his
or her preferences.
The evidence of routinization has implications for the
ideal of maximizing the level of information and deliber-
ation underlying an individuals decision to consent or
refuse consent. Thus it suggests that there is an inverse
proportionality such that the more information that is
provided, including the more often information is pro-
vided and consent requested, the more often consent
decisions are made without the consenter being truly
informed and lacking the basis of reflection. In the
debate on existing models of consent, proponents of spe-
cific consent have argued that broad consent cannot be
informed consent since only at the time of requesting
consent can it provide information in broad, abstract cat-
egories about future research project for which an indi-
viduals data and biological material may be used.24 For
a person to be truly informed in the sense of being able
to completely determine if all aspects of future research
are something to which they can consent requires a great
deal of information about the specific details of a
research project. Even if we accept this view of what
informed consent should enable the individual to
22 T. Ploug & S. Holm. Informed consent and routinisation. J Med
Ethics. 2012 2013;39(4):214–8; T. Ploug & S. Holm. Agreeing in Igno-
rance: Mapping the Routinisation of Consent in ICT-Services. Sci Eng
Ethics. 2013 Oct 30.
23 T. Ploug & S. Holm. Routinisation of Informed Consent in Online
Health Care Systems. Int J Med Inf. 2015;
24 B. Hofmann, J.H. Solbakk & S. Holm. 2009. Consent to Biobank
Research: One Size Fits All? In: D.J.H. Solbakk, D.S. Holm & D.B. Hofmann,
eds.The Ethics of Research Biobanking [Internet]. USA, Springer US; 3–23.
Available from: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-387-93872-1_1
[accessed 24 Sep 2014]; J.R. Karlsen, J.H. Solbakk & S. Holm. Ethical
Endgames: Broad Consent for Narrow Interests; Open Consent for Closed
Minds. Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2011;20(04):572–83.
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evaluate, the evidence of routinization suggests that this
will in practice not lead to maximally informed and
reflected decisions, but rather to uninformed and unre-
flected decisions. On the contrary, if the individual is
approached often with consent requests and information
about the specific details about a research project – and
it is difficult to see how a model of specific consent
should not lead to many consent requests – it is likely to
cause the routinization of consent. The risk of routiniza-
tion can be modified by limiting the amount of informa-
tion provided each time, but routinization is not sector
specific and consent may become routinized because of
practices in a different sector, e.g. in relation to internet
shopping, downloading of software and apps etc. If rou-
tinization is already present, the length of information
provided is likely to have minor effect on whether a rou-
tinized decision will be made. A model of broad consent
is not, it seems, faced with this problem since it limits the
number of requests to the individual by asking for con-
sent for broad categories of research. However, a model
of broad consent will not lead to maximally informed
and deliberated preferences for consent either. Thus a
model of broad consent limits an individuals access to
specific information about a research project even if the
individual has a strong preference for making a consent
decision on the basis of specific information.
We argue that meta consent enables maximally
informed and deliberated preferences to a greater degree
than both the models of specific and broad consent. On
the one hand, meta consent empowers the individual to
limit the consent requests – and the informational material
to process – by providing broad consent, blanket consent
or refuse consent. These types of consent will, to different
degrees, limit the number of future consent requests – the
limiting case being no future consent requests – and this
will obviously reduce the threat of routinization. On the
other hand, it also empowers the individual to require
information and consent requests for each individual
research project. In this way meta consent balances
between the threats of the consent being uninformed and
unreflected as a result of being based on too little specific
information and the threat of consent being uninformed
and unreflected as a result of too much information
through too many repeated consent requests, leading to
the routinization of consent. Meta consent allows persons
to choose this balance for themselves, based on their own
preferences and their own knowledge about their person-
ality and cognitive style.
Note also, very importantly, that there is a potential
secondary benefit of meta consent for the attempt to
protect and further informed and reflected consent deci-
sions. Thus there seems to be a significant difference
between the situation in which a consent request – as in
the models of specific and broad consent – is forced
upon an individual, and the situation in which consent
request is actively and voluntarily wished for by the indi-
vidual through a previously provided meta consent.
Reflection on the nature and purposes of research seems
more likely to happen if an individual has previously
expressed an explicit interest in providing consent to a
given type of research.
Maximally consistent preferences
Parallel to our considerations about the desirability of
models of informed consent that further informed and
deliberated preferences, it seems equally desirable that a
model of consent promotes consistency in preferences
concerning consent. Consistency in preferences may be
defined generally as a matter of entertaining identical
preferences in relevantly identical situations. If a persons
choice in a given situation is based on the persons own
preferences, failure to make the same choice in relevantly
identical situations will imply a failure by the person to
act on his or her own, true preferences. Ultimately it fol-
lows that a model of informed consent that enhances a
persons ability to exhibit consistency in preferences con-
cerning participation in research enhances that persons
ability to act on his or her true preferences.
The model of meta consent aids a person in exhibiting
consistency in preferences concerning participation in
research. It aids a person in exhibiting consistency by
presenting a comprehensive number of areas or fields in
which consistency may be exhibited. Thus those variables
of meta consent that allow for a person to make a fine-
grained choice concerning how and when to provide con-
sent, are in effect also variables that may be of relevance
for showing consistency in preferences. Thus a person
may exhibit consistency in his or her consent-choices
concerning:
• Types of consent
• Types of data, and
• Types of research institutions, and
• The possibility of changes.
A person may hold values, vulnerabilities and trust
dictating that he or she should always be asked for con-
sent for a specific research project regardless of the type
of data or research institution. Through meta consent
this person may consistently express this preference for
research on different types of data by asking for specific
consent requests. A person may hold values, vulnerabil-
ities and trust that dictate that there are relevant differen-
ces between kinds of data or kinds of research
institutions such that specific consent is only required in
particular for particular combinations of these variables.
Meta consent allows for the consistent expression of
such preferences. And, perhaps most importantly, meta
consent allows for consistency across time. Thus meta
consent will continuously serve as a reminder to a person
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of how that person has balanced values, vulnerabilities
and trust in the past in relation to research.
Alternative models of consent – specific or broad con-
sent – does not allow the individual to have different
preferences concerning future consent requests, and
therefore obviously cannot provide the individual with
an option to be consistent in relation to this specific type
of preference.
META CONSENT – OBJECTIONS AND
RESPONSES
There are two main objections to the model of meta
consent:
1) It impedes research
2) It does not provide adequate protection of a per-
sons interests etc.
We shall deal with each of these objections in turn.
Protection of research
It has been claimed in relation to our initial statement of
the meta consent idea that if meta consent is imple-
mented it will impede valuable research.25(31) It will a)
create new burdens and costs for researchers, and an
unnecessary layer of bureaucracy,26 and b) produce con-
sent bias.27 Note that this objection can only be made in
a context where researchers already have easy access to
data and tissue, and where there are no or very limited
requirements of consent. Note also that this objection is
not specific to meta consent. It applies equally to any
other model introducing a substantive requirement of
consent for the secondary use of data.
It is an open question whether a regulatory system for
the secondary use of health data and tissue could be jus-
tified without any requirements of consent or possibilities
of opt-out. We believe that a proper balancing of public
and individual interests makes some form of consent
and/or opt-out necessary. To prove this conclusively is,
however, outside the scope of this article. It is worth not-
ing that few countries have implemented consent-free
regulations in this area.
If the need for some requirement of consent and/or opt-
out is accepted, the issue becomes comparative: Is meta
consent more or less likely to impede research than alter-
native models of consent and/or the possibility of opt-out?
Let us begin with opt-out. Meta consent will actually
enhance the possibility of doing research and reduce the
risk of consent bias if some of the people who would opt-
out of research completely if offered that option only, opt-
in to some forms of research under conditions of meta
consent. Persons may have so strong objections against
one particular kind of research that they choose to opt-out
of all research if that is the only way in which they can
ensure that their data is not used for research they find
objectionable. Meta consent allows them to specifically
opt-out of such research while at the same time making
their data and tissue available for other kinds of research.
The issues around consent are more complicated. All
consent models impose some burdens and costs on
researchers but these have been considerably reduced by
the introduction of information technology and its wide-
spread use in society. It is difficult to estimate the relative
burden and costs associated with different models of
consent except that a model of specific consent is likely
to be the most expensive because it will generate the
most consent requests. In terms of the problem of con-
sent bias a model of meta consent seems likely to be a
lesser evil than models of specific and broad consent for
two reasons: 1) it allows people to provide broad and
blanket consent if they wish to, and 2) it operates on a
liberal default setting of broad or blanket consent in
the cases where people have not made any choices.
Protection of individual interests
An almost diametrically opposite objection to the model
of meta consent is that it does not provide adequate pro-
tection of an individual and his or her interests. Meta con-
sent includes the options of broad and blanket consent.
Such forms of consent do not adequately protect individu-
als because a) they are not and cannot be provided with
sufficient information to make a truly informed choice,
and b) by choosing one of these options individuals may
come to participate in research which they would have
refused to participate in if asked about the specific project.
With regard to a). First, it is not at all clear that an
adequate protection of a person through consent requires
information on a very specific level, e.g. the level of infor-
mation specified for informed consent in the Helsinki
Declaration.28 If a person holds few and general prefer-
ences of relevance for research, then information about
future research projects in general terms may be suffi-
cient for the individual to determine if participation or
non-participation is to be preferred. If, for instance, the
only relevant interest of a person is a preference for
25 T. Ploug & S. Holm. Meta consent: a flexible and autonomous way of
obtaining informed consent for secondary research. BMJ. 2015;7:350:
2146.
26 F.G. Miller. Research on Medical Records Without Informed Con-
sent. J Law Med Ethics. 2008;36(3):560–6; M.A. Rothstein. Currents in
Contemporary Ethics. J Law Med Ethics. 2009;37(3):507–12.
27 Kho et al., op. cit. note 10.
28 E. Sala, j. Burton & G. Knies. Correlates of Obtaining Informed Con-
sent to Data Linkage Respondent, Interview, and Interviewer Charac-
teristics. Sociol Methods Res. 2012;41(3):414–39; Article 26 in the 2013
version of the Helsinki Declaration lists 11 specific items of information
that should be communicated and which the participant should under-
stand, as well as the catch all “any other relevant aspects of the study”.
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health-related research, then information in general
terms about the character of future research projects may
be sufficient for this person to express an informed pref-
erence for participation in this research. Second, and
more importantly, the problem may be overridden by
deeper problems for any model of informed consent. If
routinization, as previously argued, is a real threat to the
ability of informed consent to protect individual interests
and preferences, and if routinization is in part triggered
by the number of consent requests directed to a person,
then we have a strong reason to limit the number of such
requests. Broad and blanket consent limit the number of
requests to the individual, and by incorporating these in
the model of meta consent we leave it to the individual
to balance the interest in specific information about
research projects against trust in researchers and the
interest in not being overloaded by consent requests and
other related interests and preferences. Thereby the
model of meta consent allows individuals to make what
may – given their individual psychology and interests –
be an inescapable trade-off between high levels of
detailed information and a limited number of consent
requests.29
With regard to b), it may be reasonable for individuals
to act on their preferences in relation to frequency and
specificity of consent (see above” The basic idea”) even
in the knowledge that this restricts future choices. We
generally accept that people can bind their future selves
in a variety of ways that may come into conflict with
their later preferences and interests. It is difficult to see
why secondary research use of data should be an excep-
tion. That I later come to regret a decision does not in
itself show that the decision was not reasonable or right,
when I first made it!
Having considered these objections we might in con-
clusion note that their diametrically opposed nature
could indicate that meta consent is located somewhere in
the region of the golden mean.
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